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NEUTRAL AND EQUITABLE TAXATION OF
PENSIONS AS CAPITAL INCOME
Abstract
We derive an ex post neutral comprehensive income tax on
pension schemes equivalent to a Johansson-Samuelson tax that
guarantees non-discriminatory treatment of lifetime-dependent
and other investments. By separately taxing contributions and
benefits, our concept does not require any assumptions on the
return of a pension scheme and, therefore, is of special interest
for taxing public PAYGO schemes. Assuming constant tax and
interest rates, the system is characterized by constant fractions of
deductible contributions and taxable pensions. The tax base from
neutral pension taxation considerably exceeds the one under
existing legislation, e.g. in Germany or in the U.S.














European pension systems are under growing pressure from an aging population, rising life
expectancy and a shrinking contributing workforce. Together with the reform of public
and private pension schemes diﬀerent forms of tax rules for pension income are being
introduced. The most recent example is the introduction of a voluntary, funded pension
plan to supplement the obligatory pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) pension scheme in Germany1.
The new, so-called Riester2 scheme is taxed on a cash basis: received pensions will be
taxed as personal income of the recipient whereas contributions are fully deductible.
This seems to be in line with other ways of preferential tax treatment for old-age savings as
pensions for retired civil servants, company and individual schemes are all taxed diﬀerently
with some cash ﬂow element as the common denominator. In contrast, the oﬃcial model
of the income tax system is taxation of comprehensive income. Interest income is taxed
as regular income. Business income of corporations and non-corporate ﬁrms alike is
calculated as modiﬁed accounting proﬁt, the capital invested is written oﬀ following linear
or declining balance depreciation schedules. There is no ACE3 element or immediate
write-oﬀ of the capital base4.
Overall, the tax burden on capital income depends on the legal category of an investment.
There is a dualism of income concepts in German income tax legislation with some in-
vestments, including the Riester scheme, being taxed on a consumption or cash ﬂow base,
and others being taxed on an accounting proﬁt base. As a consequence, income taxation
distorts investment and savings decisions of individuals. Even career decisions and labor
supply may be aﬀected, as individuals opt into or out of a speciﬁc pension scheme when
choosing a job.
This is not merely a German problem: France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK, and
the US all have income tax systems which, in general, tax interest income and the marginal
return on investment. At the same time, all of them provide special rules for some forms
of long-term savings or pension schemes, which resemble a cash ﬂow tax rather than a
comprehensive income tax: either contributions or pension payments can be deducted
from the tax-base, and accrued dividends or interest payments during the holding period
1§ 10a EStG (Einkommensteuergesetz, German income tax code).
2Named after the German Federal Secretary of Labor and Social aﬀairs, Walter Riester.
3ACE = allowance for the cost of equity; a frequently used term for a neutral income tax equivalent
to a cash ﬂow tax in PV terms and ﬁrst described by Boadway and Bruce (1984) and Wenger (1983).
4There are exceptions for some types of assets which can be neglected for the purpose of this paper.
1are partly or fully tax-exempt5. Clearly, by the standards of an income tax, some of the
most important long-term savings vehicles are being subsidized by tax legislation in the
major economies, and there may be good reasons for doing so. On the other hand, to
quantify these incentives the question must be raised what a non-distorting, i.e., neutral
income tax on pension schemes would look like.
This paper aims at designing feasible taxation rules for pension schemes which are neutral
in the context of a comprehensive income tax system; the yardstick being the Johansson-
Samuelson tax that taxes true economic income from all investments and savings (Prein-
reich 1951, Samuelson 1964, Johansson 1969). As the economic income from a pension
typically changes every year and, therefore, is complicated to administer, we pay special
attention to an alternative method which allows to deduct a share of contributions and
to tax a share of pensions that are constant over time. Our approach guarantees tax
neutrality especially when future pension beneﬁts – and herewith the pension’s rate of
return – are unknown during the contribution period. Therefore, it is of special interest
for the taxation of PAYGO schemes, where expected pensions not only depend on an
individual’s expected contribution but also on macroeconomic factors or policy changes.
From an individual’s point of view a pension scheme is an investment competing with
other savings forms. It is taxed neutrally if its attractiveness compared to alternative
investments is the same before and after tax. Taxation that is neutral in a broad sense
will not discriminate between investments whose return depends on an individual’s sur-
vival and other investments whose return is not lifetime-dependent. Neutrality, as we
understand it, is not restricted to ex ante or expected return6, but also requires ex post
neutral taxation of the realized return from the pension scheme.
Our view of public pension schemes as investments is not undisputed. While B¨ orsch-Supan
(2000), Homburg (2000), Schnabel (1998) and Wagener (2001) have the same perspective,
other authors like Sinn (2000) tend to regard contributions as taxes and beneﬁts as per-
sonal subsidies. It could be argued that an individual’s labor supply decision determines
the participation in a particular pension scheme. In this case, there would be no separate
pension decision. Therefore, pensions would have to be taxed like labor income, which
in the case of Germany would mean on a cash basis. This would deﬁnitely be the case if
participation were compulsory for any type of labor – employed, self-employed or civil ser-
5For an overview see PricewaterhouseCoopers (1999a, 1999b).
6This is the concept presented by Richter (1987) who uses actuarily based present values.
2vant. But even then, participation could be avoided by disguising labor income as capital
income – a problem widely observed in the Scandinavian system of dual income taxa-
tion where tax rates on labor income are higher than those on capital income (Sørensen
1994, Cnossen 1999). From the empirical evidence that individuals try to escape the com-
pulsory pension scheme (B¨ orsch-Supan and Schnabel 1998) follows that the decisions on
labor supply und pension participation can be separated. Therefore, interpreting pension
schemes as investments seems appropriate.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we refer to the Johansson-Samuelson tax
which serves as a yardstick for a neutral comprehensive income tax. The neutral tax base
is derived for a deterministic lifetime of the recipient. Section 3 relaxes this restrictive
assumption. It deals with tax corrections when either contribution or pension period
diﬀer from their expected values. Section 4 shows how tax neutrality can be reached after
distorting tax treatment of contributions or pensions. Part 5 summarizes and concludes.
2 Two forms of neutral taxation
2.1 Net present value before tax
The economic attractiveness of a pension scheme is described by its net present value








Ct (1 + i)
−t +
b TC+b TP X
t=b TC+1
Pt (1 + i)
−t (1)
with Ct: contribution in period t
i: discount rate (before tax)
NPV0: NPV of the total cash ﬂow
NPV C
0 : PV of contributions (before tax)
NPV P
0 : PV of pensions (before tax)
Pt: pension in period t
t: time index
b TP: expected length of pension period
b TC: expected length of contribution period.
Contributions are being paid during 1 ≤ t ≤ b TC, after that, in b TC +1 ≤ t ≤ b TC + b TP, the
individual receives the pension beneﬁts, the pension period thus having b TP periods. For
reasons of convenience we restrict our analysis to contributions and beneﬁts growing at










t−(b TC+1) Pb TC+1 for b TC + 1 ≤ t ≤ b TC + b TP
0 otherwise
. (3)

























with a(·): annuity factor as a function of discount rate, growth rate and time.
We further assume a constant and proportional income tax rate τ, an immediate and
complete loss-oﬀset and a uniform and time-invariant capital market rate i which is used
as the discount rate. Contribution period and beneﬁt period are known with certainty.
Only later, in section 3, we analyze contribution and beneﬁt periods of length TC 6= b TC
and TP 6= b TP, respectively.
2.2 Neutrality condition when future beneﬁts are unknown
The Johansson-Samuelson tax – which is the ideal form of a neutral comprehensive income
tax – ensures neutrality by economic depreciation of all investments. As a consequence,
PVs, the decision criterion for investment alternatives, are invariant with respect to tax
rates, which implies that PVs before tax (τ = 0) and after tax (τ > 0) are equal:
NPV
τ
0 = NPV0. (5)
A suﬃcient condition for equation (5) is the identity of the tax base and economic income
in each period. Economic income is deﬁned as the return i on the PVt−1 of an investment
at the beginning of the period: πt = i · PVt−1. Obviously, the PV is a function of
all future cash ﬂows, i.e., contributions and beneﬁts. As future beneﬁts of a PAYGO
scheme are typically unknown during the contribution period, the neutral tax base in the
contribution period cannot be calculated. Therefore, we use the fact that invariance of
the PV for the constant discount rate i and the tax rate τ is also given if the PV of all tax
bases equals the PV of economic income over the total investment period. We split up
the total cash ﬂow into two components: contributions and beneﬁts, and compute PVs for
4both periods separately. This does not require any assumption about the relative weight
of contributions vs. beneﬁts or – in other words – about the return on contributions.









0 ⇒ NPV0 = NPV
τ
0 . (6)
























t : contribution after tax in period t
iτ = i(1 − τ): discount rate after tax
NPV τ
0 : total NPV after tax
NPV
C,τ
0 : PV after tax of contributions
NPV
P,τ
0 : PV after tax of beneﬁts
P τ
t : pension beneﬁt after tax in period t.
In the following sections we describe two diﬀerent forms of a neutral tax on the pension
scheme, which are both based on the idea of separating PVs of contributions and beneﬁts.
2.3 Taxing economic income
If taxing economic income πt delivers a tax rate-invariant PV of the total investment, the





















































t−1 yields the expression for the economic income from contributions πC
t , i.e.,





t−1 = −iC1 (1 + gC)
t−1 a

i,gC, b TC − (t − 1)

. (11)
5Economic income from contributions is negative at any date 0 < t ≤ b TC given the fact
that all contributions and their PV are negative. Calculating the PV of all (negative) tax
















Equation (12) has an obvious interpretation: the PV of the neutral tax burden is the
diﬀerence between pre-tax contributions discounted at the after-tax rate and the pre-tax








, the PV of taxes for
the contribution period is negative. Thus, in sum, the PV of contributions after tax equals
the one before tax, and we have proven that condition (6) holds for the contribution part
of the pension scheme.
Analogously, economic income from the cash ﬂow of beneﬁts πP
t can be derived through
















b TP + b TC

− (t − 1)

for b TC + 1 ≤ t ≤ b TC + b TP





for 1 ≤ t ≤ b TC.
(13)
This term is always positive. There is a positive tax base already in the contribution
phase 1 ≤ t ≤ b TC as the PV of the beneﬁt stream is compounding by (1 + i). This
positive imputed income at each date of the contribution phase has to be added to the
(negative) tax base from contributions (11). Obviously, this can only be done if the level
of future pension beneﬁts is known at any date 1 ≤ t ≤ b TC of the contribution phase.
If this is not the case, there are at least two ways to ensure neutrality: wait until the
PV of pensions is certain and recover taxes then, or make preliminary assumptions about
Pb TC+1,gP, and b TP and correct them as soon as actual ﬁgures are known. The advantage
of taxation based on estimated parameters would be to level tax payments over time as
the positive tax base could be oﬀset against the negative tax base from contributions at
every date of the contribution phase. In contrast, waiting until pensions are paid is more
in line with traditional tax legislation and tax payers’ intuition as tax payments are not
triggered by the accrual of unfunded and somewhat shaky claims. Such a technique of
postponed taxation is developed in the following section.
7The derivation is given in the appendix.
6The NPV at date t = 0 of all taxes paid on the economic income from pension beneﬁts





























Again, taxes are the diﬀerence between the PVs of the cash ﬂow discounted at the rates
after and before tax, respectively. This is equivalent to (12) for contributions, the only
diﬀerence being an additional discount from date t = b TC, the beginning of the beneﬁt
phase, to t = 0, the point of reference.
2.4 Taxing a constant share of contributions and pensions
As economic income does not directly depend on the cash income or payment of the
period but rather on the PV of the remaining cash ﬂow after the current tax date, the
concept is rather complicated to administer and diﬃcult to understand for taxpayers.
Obviously, it would be much more convenient to have a tax base that is directly linked
to the payments – contribution or beneﬁt – of the same period as a constant share of it.
Actually, this type of tax rule can be observed in some countries’ legislation: Under US
law, the employer’s share of contributions to a pension scheme is tax deductible while
the employee’s contributions are deductible only for particular pension schemes and up
to legally speciﬁed limits (Sec. 401 ﬀ. IRC). By comparison, under German tax law,
pension beneﬁts and other annuities received are taxable to a percentage that depends on
the expected length of the annuity phase (§ 22 EStG). In our context of neutral pension
taxation two issues arise, a theoretical and a practical one: ﬁrst, we explore what neutral
constant-share taxation would look like, second, we use our ﬁndings to evaluate whether
actual taxation of the obligatory German pension scheme complies with the neutrality
conditions and thus can be regarded as systematically correct.
As we have argued before, it is only suﬃcient, but not necessary for neutral income
taxation that the tax base in each period is equal to economic income. A less restrictive
condition is the identity of PVs of economic income with the tax bases to be deﬁned, or
– which is equivalent for a constant tax rate – identity of the PV of taxes paid under
both rules. We assume a constant share αb TC of contributions to be tax-deductible and a
constant share of pension beneﬁts β b TC,b TP to be taxable income. After-tax contributions
8This can be derived in analogy to (12) with an additional discounting to the point of reference t = 0.












1 − τ β b TC,b TP

Pt. (16)




























with αb TC: constant share of contributions for (expected) contribution phase b TC
β b TC,b TP: constant share of pension beneﬁts for (expected) beneﬁt phase b TP.
Again, we have to look at the two phases separately since we still assume the level of
beneﬁts to be unknown during the contribution phase. If beneﬁts are known at date
t = 0 there exists more than one solution for NPV τ
0
! = NPV0. Tax authorities would thus
be free to set one of the two parameters β b TC,b TP and αb TC. An increased share of deductible
contributions could then be oﬀset through a higher taxable share of pensions. We start






































. A positive share
of contribution payments results in a negative tax payment or tax reimbursement. αb TC
has to be set once, at the beginning of the contribution phase, and can then be applied
to calculate the deductible share of all future contributions. The second element of the
















As expected, it is equal to the PV of taxes on the economic income from contributions,
given in equation (12). Another way of deriving αb TC is equating the PVs of taxes on αb TC
and on economic income9.
9For the complete calculus hereof see Kiesewetter and Niemann (2001).
8Figure 1 illustrates equation (19) for contribution periods of one through ﬁfty years and
for contributions constant over time (solid line) and growing by gC = 4% annually (dotted
line), respectively. We assume a tax rate of τ = 30%. For gC = 4% the neutral deductible
contribution share αb TC is in the range of 63% to 80% for contribution phases between 30
and 40 years. This is approximately the deductible fraction of total contributions paid by
employers and employees under German tax law10.
Figure 1: Neutral deductible share αb TC as a function of the contribution period b TC
—————–: decuctible share of contributions αb TC
for τ = 30%, i = 5% and gC = 0
– – – – – – –: decuctible share of contributions αb TC
for τ = 30%,i = 5% and gC = 4%
The taxable share of pension beneﬁts β b TC,b TP can be derived in the same way as αb TC,




















10Most authors estimate that about 70 percent of total contributions are deductible on average; Wellisch
(2001), p. 287 and Wiegard (2000), p. 9. By German tax law, employers’ contributions are fully
deductible, and employees’ contributions can be deducted up to a limit which depends on individual
circumstances, § 10 (3) EStG. For an overview see PricewaterhouseCoopers (1999b), p. 148.
11Again, the equivalent but more complicated way of equating present values of taxes on the share
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Contribution period (years)Solving for β b TC,b TP yields the following expression for the taxable share of pension beneﬁts:


















As β b TC,b TP is positive for all tax rates 0 < τ < 1 every positive pension payment results
in a positive tax base and tax payment. The taxable share of pensions is an increasing
function of the contribution period b TC:























The economic explanation for (23) is easy: because we don’t tax the economic income from
(future) pensions during the contribution phase we have to compensate for these taxes
later, when taxing the share β b TC,b TP of pension payments. The longer the contribution
period the bigger the accumulated, hitherto untaxed appreciations of the PV of pensions
we have to make up for.
Figure2denotestheneutraltaxableshareofpensionsaccordingtoequation(22)for
pensionperiodsof1to30years.Pensionsareconstant(solidline)andgrowingbygP =
1.5% p.a. (dotted line), respectively. As in the previous example, the other parameters
are τ = 30% and i = 5%. We assume pension payments after a contribution period of
TC=35.Unlikethedeductionsforcontributionstheseneutraltaxbasesaremuchhigher
than the taxable pension income under German income tax law. For an expected pension
period of 14 years12, e.g., the neutral tax base is approximately 150% of pension beneﬁts
instead of the actual taxable share of pension beneﬁts of 27%. This high fraction is due
to the fact that βTC,b TP is an increasing function of the contribution period TC preceeding
pension payments. In contrast, the legal deﬁnition of the tax base does not depend on
the contribution period in any way.
12According to the mortality statistics for Germany 1986/88 underlying the German tax code, this
corresponds to a pension age of 65 years of a male recipient. See § 14 and appendix 9 BewG (Bewer-
tungsgesetz, German law on the assessment of assets and liabilities).
10Figure 2: Neutral taxable share βTC,b TP as a function of the pension period b TP
—————–: taxable share of pensions βTC,b TP
for TC = 35, τ = 30%, i = 5% and gP = 0
– – – – – – –: taxable share of pensions βTC,b TP
for TC = 35, τ = 30%,i = 5% and gP = 1.5%
3 Ex post neutral taxation when contribution or pen-
sion periods are uncertain
Both methods of taxing pension contributions and beneﬁts derived in the previous section
are neutral if and only if the duration of the contribution and beneﬁt phases are known
with certainty. This is rather unlikely for public pension schemes and, in part, for privately
contracted annuity plans. Depending on the speciﬁcs of a public pension scheme, there
may be contribution-free times during a participant’s active phase and future beneﬁts
not only depend on the contribution history but also on macroeconomic factors or the
actual policy when a participant enters the beneﬁt phase. But undoubtedly, the most
important reason for deviations of actual from expected pension durations is the fact
that an individual’s lifetime may be longer or shorter than the average life expectancy of
his/her cohort.
Given these uncertainties, taxation of pension schemes based on average assumptions on
the contribution phase b TC and the pension phase b TP will not be neutral in many cases.
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Pension period (years)life expectancy will thus not be indiﬀerent between a pension scheme and a pre-tax equally
proﬁtable long-term investment which is not lifetime-dependent even if the tax parame-
ters are actuarily correct on average. An individual who expects to outlive the average
would favor a pension plan because of non-neutral taxation. Neglecting this restricts
the neutrality concept considerably to a mere ex ante decision neutrality for “average”
individuals. Theoretically, neutrality could be reached be applying subjective instead of
statistical life expectancies. Individual ex ante assessment of taxpayers, though, is not
feasible for three reasons: administrative eﬃciency, legal certainty, and non-revelation of
individual beliefs. Instead, ex post corrections are practicable and can be anticipated by
taxpayers when deciding on their investments.
Furthermore, ex ante neutrality does not guarantee equal taxation of equal cash ﬂows.
A participant who was expected to receive pension beneﬁts during 14 years but dies
after 10 years would have to pay higher taxes than a participant receiving the same
pension payment and whose actual and expected pension phase is 10 years. Another
taxpayer receiving beneﬁts for 10 years who was expected to live for only 6 years would
pay still less. Contrary to this, ex post tax correction for deviating contribution or beneﬁt
phases can ensure invariance of the NPV in all cases thus ensuring neutrality and equity.
This concept guarantees tax neutrality for individuals with biased as well as unbiased
expectations of their own lifetime irrespective of whether these expectations prove right
or wrong.
3.1 Correcting for a diﬀering contribution phase
We assume that a share of contribution payments αb TC has been deducted. If the actual
contribution phase lasts TC 6= b TC periods a corrective additional tax payment must be
calculated such that the PV of tax payments is neutral with respect to TC periods13.
Tax correction can be done through a one-oﬀ payment or through periodical additional
payments.
3.1.1 One-oﬀ correction
The PV of neutral taxation of a contribution phase of TC 6= b TC periods is:
TaxPV
neutral
TC = −C1 [a(iτ,gC,TC) − a(i,gC,TC)]. (24)
13The correction technique presented here ca be regarded as a special case for taxing annuities of a
more general approach developed by K¨ onig (1997).
12Eﬀectively paid (here: received) taxes based on the deductible share αb TC during TC periods
have a PV of:
TaxPV
actual













The PV of the corrective tax payment in t = TC is the diﬀerence between these terms



















α : Corrective tax payment to ensure ex post neutrality.
∆
TC/b TC
α is positive for a shorter contribution phase TC < b TC. For a longer contribution
phase TC > b TC, the deductible share leading to neutrality αTC is greater than αb TC which
had been applied for the taxation of contributions, and the participant receives a one-oﬀ
reimbursement of overpaid taxes.
3.1.2 Periodic correction
When the actual contribution phase is longer than expected, i.e., TC > b TC, a periodic
tax correction could be made instead of the one-oﬀ reimbursement ∆
TC/b TC
α . We derive
the periodic corrective payment assuming that the contribution phase is extended by one












i,gC, b TC + 1
i
. (27)















The diﬀerence gives the PV of the neutral tax deduction in b TC + 114:
TaxPV
neutral
b TC+1 − TaxPV
neutral
b TC








14See appendix B for the derivation.
13Compounding it to the date of payment results in the tax reimbursement in period b TC+1:









The additional reimbursement must be calculated if at date b TC +1 a tax deduction based
on αb TC has already been granted. This is the diﬀerence between the neutral tax in b TC +1
and the amount already granted. The latter is:
−τ C1 (1 + gC)














The remaining reimbursement after subtracting this is:
∆
b TC+1/b TC


















3.2 Correcting for a diﬀering beneﬁt phase
At the beginning of the beneﬁt phase following a contribution phase of TC periods the



















For TC 6= b TC this expression diﬀers from β b TC,b TP under certainty, which was given in
equation (22), because it is a function of the length of the preceeding contribution period.
The realized duration TC now replaces b TC
15. Note that (33) is an increasing function of
TC but does not depend on the amount of the contributions paid. In most cases, the
actual beneﬁt period TP will diﬀer from the assumed b TP. Thus, having taxed a share
βTC,b TP of pension payments requires an ex post correction for neutrality.
3.2.1 One-oﬀ correction














15In the basic case we assume the remaining life expectancy of a tax payer to be b TP when entering the
beneﬁt phase after a b TC-period contribution. For a contribution phase of TC 6= b TC the remaining life
expectancy thus will be b TP − b TC + TC rather than b TP. Therefore, it could be argued that the taxable
share of pensions should be ﬁxed as βTC,(b TP−b TC+TC) instead of βTC,b TP. Whatever the value for b TP, tax
corrections will be necessary in most cases as almost nobody exactly realizes the expected lifetime.
14and the PV of the taxes actually levied is:
TaxPV
actual






















Hence, we get the corrective tax payment by compounding the diﬀerence of (34) and (35)





















β > 0 results in an additional tax payment for longer pension phases TP > b TP. If
pension payments end earlier than assumed, then ∆
b TP+1/b TP
β < 0 and taxes have to be paid
back. As this reimbursement takes place at the death of the taxpayer we must assume
that payments to heirs yield the same utility as payments to the taxpayer.
3.2.2 Periodic correction
During the beneﬁt phase regular tax payments are always positive. The taxable income
from pension payments is an increasing function of the length of the pension phase. In
other words: the longer pensions are paid, the higher the neutral taxable share βTC,b TP.
Thus, there will be an additional tax payment if the pension phase proves to be longer
than assumed. If the actual period TP is much longer than b TP the one-oﬀ corrective tax
payment may easily exceed the last pension payment itself. Therefore, a periodic tax
correction for longer than expected pension periods is of practical interest. This can be
derived in complete analogy to the periodic correction of taxation of contributions. The
neutral tax payment in period t = TC + b TP + 1 is:









If at date t = TC + b TP + 1 taxes have already been levied on the basis of βTC,b TP as it has
been ﬁxed ex ante, only the diﬀerence between this and (37) must be paid on top:
∆
b TP+1/b TP






















154 Ex post neutrality after arbitrary treatment of con-
tributions
In the previous section we have presented a tax correction technique in order to ensure ex
post neutrality when the contribution or beneﬁt phases diﬀer from the assumed underlying
tax parameters. Obviously, the same technique works not only for diﬀering durations
but also for any other deviation from neutral taxation. There is one case of practical
importance: taxation of pension schemes according to existing, non-neutral legislation
can ex post be converted into a neutral tax.
We assume a non-neutral share αG of contributions to be deductible and a non-neutral
share βG of beneﬁts to be taxable. As they will typically diﬀer from the neutral shares
αTC and βTC,TP tax corrections will be necessary for every participant.
The PV of neutral taxes on contributions is deﬁned as before:
TaxPV
neutral
TC = −C1 [a(iτ,gC,TC) − a(i,gC,TC)], (39)
the PV of actual taxes during TC periods is:
TaxPV
actual
TC = −τ αG C1 a(iτ,gC,TC). (40)
Compounding the diﬀerence to the date of payment t = TC yields:
∆
TC








= −C1 (1 + iτ)
TC [(1 − τ αG) a(iτ,gC,TC) − a(i,gC,TC)]. (41)
Correcting taxation on beneﬁts will take place at date t = TC +TP, when the last pension













whereas the PV of taxes actually paid is:
TaxPV
actual




Subtracting and compounding yields the corrective tax payment at t = TC + TP:
∆
TP/b TP
βG/β = (1 + iτ)
TC+TP PTC+1










In this paper, we have shown two diﬀerent ways of levying an ex post neutral income tax
on pension schemes, which are equivalent under certainty about future pension beneﬁts
and the duration of the contribution and the beneﬁt phases. However, it is a general
problem of public PAYGO pension schemes that future beneﬁts are uncertain throughout
the entire contribution phase. Demographic and other macroeconomic trends as well as
possible policy shifts make beneﬁts hard to predict. Furthermore, the return of a pension
scheme typically depends on various individual factors like the cohort the participant
belongs to, gender, possible survivor beneﬁts, etc.
To arrive at a tax that is equivalent to a Johansson-Samuelson tax in PV terms, we suggest
to tax a constant share of beneﬁts which is a function of the amount and future growth of
the annuity, its expected duration, the capital market rate and the individual’s marginal
tax rate. By doing so, the same tax burden is realized as would result from taxing
economic income from the pension beneﬁts, starting in period one of the contribution
phase. In contrast to this, taxation of a constant share of beneﬁts starts only at the
beginning of the pension phase, when the amount to be received is known.
In addition, economic income from the cash ﬂow of contributions has to be taxed in the
same way. As these payments are negative, so is economic income, i.e., the tax base from
contributions, leading to a tax reimbursement in each period of the contribution phase.
Two methods are applicable: taxing economic income or a constant deductible share of
contributions. Since economic income has to be calculated for each period, it is the more
complex concept.
A common problem of our solutions is the necessity to make assumptions about the
length of contribution and beneﬁt phases. If these are uncertain, it is necessary to adjust
taxation ex post in order to reach neutrality deﬁned in a broad sense. In reality, some
more determinants of the neutral tax are uncertain and must be assumed, among them
the market rate of interest or the individual’s tax rate. Therefore, a feasible tax base
can only approximate economic income, although, theoretically, a tax correction could be
made for any deviation from neutral taxation, not only those caused by the time aspect
we have focussed on.
Comparing our ﬁndings to actual tax legislation on pensions in Germany shows that
the latter cannot even serve as a rough approximation of a Johansson-Samuelson tax.
17Rather, it resembles some kind of modiﬁed cash ﬂow tax. This is the declared aim of
the newly introduced chapter on the taxation of the new, funded Riester pension scheme.
However, taxation of the PAYGO scheme which has been practiced for more than forty
years has unintentionally had a similar eﬀect for an average participant: about two thirds
of contributions of an average participant are deductible and about one third of pension
beneﬁts are treated as taxable income. This means that most of the return on probably
the biggest part of long-term savings of German taxpayers has never been subject to tax,
whereas most other capital income is fully taxable under German tax law.
Our paper shows a way to reform pension taxation in order to bring it in line with a
comprehensive income tax. As a consequence, the tax burden on pension income would
rise dramatically given current income tax rates. For an average retiree the taxable
income from beneﬁts would have to be approximately ﬁve times higher than the actual
tax base. That this was politically inacceptable even in the better days of the German
PAYGO scheme may very well be the explanation for the persistence of an element of
consumption taxation in a tax code whose oﬃcial paradigm during half a century has
been and still seems to be to tax marginal return on capital as regular income.
Given the enormous tax rise and its hardly predictable eﬀects on people’s savings decisions,
the question arises whether taxing economic income can be a model for tax reform at all.
If the answer is no, the conclusion must be to tax consumption instead of income through
some type of cash ﬂow or ACE tax. This, of course, would concern any source of income,
not only pensions.
18Appendix
A Present value of neutral taxes on contributions

































































































































































































































The present value of neutral taxes on the economic income from pension beneﬁts (14) can
be derived analogously taking into account an additional discounting of b TC periods to the
point of reference t = 0.
B Periodic correction of contributions
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